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by the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), three by the United 
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Preface 
On the occasion of the inauguration of the Freedom from Hunger 
Campaign, the Secretary-General of the United Nations welcomed the 
initiative taken by the Food and Agriculture Organization and its Director- 
General "to center world attention and to speed action, both national and 
international, on the continuing problem of hunger and malnutrition" and 
pledged the vigorous and enthusiastic support of the United Nations toward 
the achievement of the goals of the Campaign. As one of the facets of this 
support, the Secretary-General agreed that the United Nations would pre- 
pare and issue three pamphlets dealing with some of the more general 
implications of the Campaign. The present pamphlet on "Population and 
Food Supply" is accompanied by two others-~n "Aspects of Economic 
Development'' and on "National Development Efforts." 
Since the inauguration of the Freedom from Hunger Campaign, the 
General Assembly of the United Nations has decided to designate the cur- 
rent decade as the Unibd Nations Development Decade in which all memo 
ber governments and their peoples, as well as the United Nations family 
of organizations, would intensify their efforts for the economic and d a l  
advancement of the under-developed countries. Noting the close relation- 
ship between the objectives of the two campaigns, the Director-General of 
the PAO fecently proposed, and the Secretary-General of the United Nations 
wholeheartedly agreed, that the Freedom from Hunger Campaign, should 
be an important part of the United Nations Development Decade. It is, 
therefore, hoped that the three pamphlets prepared by the United Nations 
for the Freedom from Hunger Campaign will contribute to a better under- 
standing of the close relationship between the problems of population 
growth and economic development on the one hand and freedom from 
hunger on the other within the broader context of the Development Decade. 

Foreword 
The fist half af the twentieth century hus witnessed three major rev& 
tiom. The political revolution har given self-government to nearly a third 
of the world's populution and has brought their aspiratiom for a better life 
to the forefront o f  world attention. The revolution in communicatiom has 
broken down the barriers of distance and languclge, and the dynamism of 
idear cmt no longer be contained within the firnits dictated by social privilege 
or political considerations. The demographic revolution has imparted to the 
cWmge  of poverty and want a new dimension. 
r 
It is against this background that the Freedom from Hunger Campaign 
was launched in 1960 by the Food mad Agn*culture Organization of the 
United Nations* Its muin objectives are twofold: first, to create a world- 
wide awareness of the problems of hunger and mulnutrition whicfi aipict 
more than a half o f  the world% population and which, apart from the human 
sugering Ond human degtadation that they involve, pose a seripus theat 
to peace a d  vrderly progress, and second, to prOnu,te a climate of opinion 
in which solutions to these problems can be organized both on a nationid 
and on an internutiod basis. 
In the short time since its launching, the Campaign has alrea'dy provided 
a focus for co-operative endemor for internatz*unal organizations, ~ t i o n d  
govemmertts, nongovernmental organizations und various citizens' groups 
alt over the world. The 104 Member Nutions attending the biennial session 
of the FAO Conference in November 1961 paid u d m o u s  tribute to the 
significance of this Cmpaigfi for the future well-being of the world. 
The Freedom from Hunger Campaign attempts to attack the problem 
of hunger on a b r d  front d ot all levels of economic and social thought 
a d  actww but fur practical purposes, it defines three sectors of operation: 
(a) information mod education, (6) research, and (c) action. 
The infurmation rmd education sector will help bring to citizens every- 
+ 
where a living awareness of the concrete facts and issues, and provide bases 
for deciding what new national a d  international policies and action pro- 
g r a m  me needed. This effort to create informed and active awareness will mi 
rise to a climax witk the WorId Food Congrew to be held v& FAO au@c&# 
in 1963. Mmry i n t ~ * o m l  profesdonul and citizens' grotips will hold 
f o ~ n r  on Cmpcuogn hum in 1962 and 1963. Many n&unal Cmpm'gm 
C ~ * t t e t i s  will obo otgm0irc similar Ctismsio~u. R e p r e ~ e n ~ ~ v ~  from dl
fhes bodies arc expected to participate in the World Food Coqgress ad-+. 
help briqg into faw policies a d  action plmu for the fatwe. 
T k  s&s o f  Basic Studies has been prepared by FAO ond other et+ 
qemtihg Wermtibonal orgmez&ibns to aid citiztm in discussling the g r d  
ham invdved. 
Thuc dmuments attempt to e M ~ m m m f i e  the known facts and agreed COB- 
c l ~ ~  o f  experts in coch special field, and thus provide useful mtd reliable 
backgroowrd material for study groups and public discussi011~. 
The vdurncs in this series cover b r d  subjects suck m  he adequacy 
of fd be2s in the world, the possibilities o f  produamng more food, umf 
tk ways in which ~ C O I M ) ~  development and training in the newly dkwelop- 
ing &bunhies can raise buying power and thus k l p  hungty people to b e  
mcm food for kmsehttcs. They brfng out thc central impurtwtce of good 
mrtrih'un for health and work& e#I&ncy, cnd study how people can led 
to chaosc their f& b~ter .  They appraise thc efl'oris being made in h: 
dividd COWS to r& food output, to increw jobs and incomes, a d  
to tr& mui educate people in ways to i m e w  production ond in bet& 
&tmy hnbits. The volumes cover the rehiion of food prodadon to climatf 
mrd weather, the better d3tdbution and mketirrig of food, aiad the use 
of avdldle surp3- to relieve hunger und provide an imentive to ecowmic 
mui socid development in the developittg cuuntticsm 
I trUpt thcll these Basic Stndies will stimulate thought and action on the 
critical problem of hunger artd contribute to an ever-expanding undcrs~d-  
ing of the related social, economic and technical &sues. 
B. R. SEN 
Director-General 
Food and Agriidture Organization ! 
of the United Nations 
xii 
Introduction 
Freedom from hunger, as well as freedom from fear, want, and persecution, 
was recognized by the founders of the United Nations as a basic right which 
should be guaranteed to all peoples. Even before the organization of the 
United Nations in 1945, some of the members-to-be began to assemble in 
smaller groups to consider common problems affecting these basic freedoms. 
One important meeting was convened by President Roosevelt at Hot Springs, 
Virginia, in May 1943, to consider the question of the world's food supply. 
Out of this conference emerged the Food and Agriculture Organization, 
devoted to the noble purpose of raising levels of nutrition and standards of 
living throughout the world. The participating governments signed the estab- 
lishing articles of agreement at the White House later that year and FAO 
became a specialized agency of the United Nations on 16 October 1945. 
FAO is now in its sixteenth year of activity as a United Nations agency. It 
continuously surveys the food resources of the world, and sets up research 
and extension programmes to assuage the world's hunger. FAO surveys have 
provided the most extensive and realistic information available concerning 
t the world's food resources. Its cooperative projects, in which many nations . have taken part, have done much to stimulate the production of food, its preservation from predators, and its effective distribution around the world. 
Although the resources available to FAO have always been extremely limited 
in relation to the magnitude of the problem, remarkable progress has been 
made in the achievement of these objectives. 
But today the need to increase food resoutces is a large and more pressing 
problem than ever. It is necessary to increase food production at an accelcm- 
ing rate in order to feed a population which is growing, in the world as a 
whole, at a more rapid rate than ever before. Moreover, food consumption 
per capita must be raised in the large parts of the world where the present 
levels are too low for health, and the rapid growth of population makes this 
a much more =cult matter. 
It now appears that the 1960's will be crucial in determining the patterns 
of both future world population growth and the increase and development of 
p o p d a t k m s w  rammas, facilities 
d qmdwtion bema 
Uletartd~gad~tio11ipe-orn,mdamey 
dem- inv01ved provides no 
ThePimofthet~oWiDgmportistomey 
hamoccllcred, a a d a n ~ d g t o o c c o r ,  in
a n d ~ ~ t h t e f f e c t w h i c h t h e 1 4 e c b a g ~  
ability of world fwd supplies. 
C H A P T E R  I 
Recent Trends 
in World Population 
The problem of hunger itself is not new, but the present magnitude of the 
problem transcends all previous haman experience. 
Mim has always been dependent to a varying extent on the fluctuating 
edogical balance between people and tbe basic resources available to feed 
them, and although the capacity of the land to support human life has been 
constantly increased by human invention, the balance between between d- 
ciency and fa& remained precarious throughout the world for centuries, 
and remains precarious to this day in some regio~.  
As human invention and abilities grew, the population also grew, though 
not n d y  in proportion to the increase in capacity for fwd production. 
At times, in various parts of the world, population outgrew the resources 
available at the time to feed it, and depopulation, by famine, disease or war, 
wm the inevitable result. 
However, it is true to say that over the long span of man's ten- of this 
earth, a gradual upward trend in the human population curve is established. 
From a relatively ran creature over half a million years ago, man (or proto- 
man) moved upward tram tms or hundreds of thousands to tens and hun- 
Qbds of millions by the beghmhg of the Chistian era. For the t h e  d 
U11ist~8 birth, scholars very tentatively set the total world population in the 
neighborhood of 200-300 million. This guess is probably as good rn the 
assamption generally accepted that this number approximately doubled by 
the middle of the 17th Century to 500 million. The thousand minion marL 
was reached about two centuries later--by 1850; and in the snaxeding 110 
years the 3,000 million mark hat been reached. 
The rapidity of the recent increase contrasts sharply with the slow growth 
of past ages. To grow from some timeshrouded "beginning" to a few millions 
seems to have taken hundreds or thousands of millennia. Ages psMed before 
the 250 million mark was reached two thousand years ago. Sixteen centuries 
more before the population reached 500 million. Then suddenly, it doubled 
in only two and a half centuries, and again in one century. Now world popu- 
lation is increasing at a rate which would double the number in about forty 
years. And the end is not necessarily in sight, for ceitain populations number- 
iag~lniI l lolumnowgmlwlqgd antethattheyu~~~M-doubbir 
tw- .&rs yemi. r 
tba early years of tht 19th century, mluticmuy h 1 o p m ~  
cxmrmd fn the me&& of producing ths n ~ d *  and 
New scmca d power and new methods of txampodt have 
and progmw in fnedkd science ir one of &&.factors which have led to # 
dsdirse ia m o r t w .  + 5:. 
To am%& all the tlbw4d@mg! h in the past 1% 
years to dkmeries in mortality control an exaggeration. 
Without revolutions in technology, agriculture and transportation, such 
multitudes could not have been supported. On the other hand, without tbe 
b 1 d p . a a d h -  to contrd cpidpnics, tht modem ~ ~ 4 ~ s  nudd 
thaathc~ciet~~m~arerrandth4bLcacaacsih 
.has notbcena.mapr sba~ 1919, when Mm- b Ixdkmed 
case& 25 miOiam 
words, world and national p o p ~ n  gmwth has dpittad fn#ll 
of gaias and loses to a steady npid upward trend. 
these changes, a 6ertility rate which only a few genere 
tomb survival9 now r e d t ~  in a rapid rnultipfiicatb~ 
of e v e r b e ~ c o n t r o l o f m ~ .  
Through a l l  of man's prevbw history only a fractian d all tht babk bFlan 
hadgroamtrsmattdty;~~ htheindw&ialoonn;briaofhWest,o~S% 
& Mare d*. gk. ta basigM ehil&en per wompn wen ome 
laac!mBwOomaiaeaia 
dzarpsaarntaanan .to smhtaira stable popalatioa in thc 
hmd:-~es. . 1 
-hq tbs Westem natkm.*tB led tha In- RR7folUtiqm tlnd tbs 
. f t a r l u w ~ ~ ~ b t a v d b y a ~ ~ r P d ~ ~ a f  
ed~~la-.M.pop* gmslrth' in the id- mm&. In noain$usM 
c ~ u a ~ , m t h e o t h c r h a n d , t h p ~ i d ~ i n d e d l t h r a t e g i n r ~ t ~  
hasaatystlmmbolawadbyabhinbirth~~. * 
gams at rates which appwr d u -  
of =Eez Efistmical eymcbs. In tht United 
States of America, for instance, the prevailing rate of approximately three 
children per woman is only about half what was considered a minimum in 
traditional frontier society. Yet even this quite modest rate of reproduction, 
as compared with a century ago, serves to increase the population at the rate 
of almost 50 per cent per generation. 
In the countries of the world other than those mentioned above, relatively 
little control of fertility is exercised and families are large. With persistently 
high birth rates and declining death rates, population growth already at an 
unprecedentedly high level, still tends to accelerate in precisely those regions 
where such growth creates the most serious social and economic problems. 
The rates of natural increase at present exceed three per cent a year in many 
of the countries in the less developed regions-enough to double the popu- 
lation in twenty-five years or less. In a few countries the increase even a p  
proaches a rate of four per cent. As low death rates are extended over wider 
and wider areas, it appears likely that increases of more than three per cent 
a year will soon be the rule in the underdeveloped regions which contain 
two thirds of the earth's inhabitants. 
The continuation of high fertility in the face of the reduction of mortality, 
particularly in the economically less advanced regions, is the crux of the 
population problem in the world today, and is an integral and essential factor 
in any realistic approach to the food outlook. 
The demographic, social and economic statistics available today are ade- 
quate to permit a classification of the regions of the earth and most of the 
nations. Even though such data are admittedly inadequate for certain parts 
of the world, it is possible to distinguish certain regional categories in the 
light of present conditions and future prospects. 
With respect to density and degree of technological advance, four cate- 
gories of regions may be distinguished: 
1. Technologically developed, lowdensity regions - including North 
America, temperate South America, Australia, New Zealand and the Soviet 
Union. 
2. Technologically developed, high density regions-including Europe and 
Japan. 
3. Technologically underdeveloped, lowdensity regions - including 
Africa, parts of Central America, tropical South America, Southwest Asia 
and the Pacific Islands. 
4. Technologically underdeveloped, highdensity regions-including th 
Caribbean, central South Asia, southeast Asia and east Asia (except Japan). 
Obviously, the countries within these groups still differ from each other 
in very important respects. The technological development of North America 
and temmte South America is very different. The situation in Barbad@# 
(with a population density of l,3W per square mile) is very different fmsP 
in India. 
out  of o total world population of 3,000 million in 1961, the p@&tiigg 
in &e technologically developed regions amounted to a little over 1,000 
million. As re- the developed regions, about half the population lies in 
the h i g h h s i i  regions, and half in the low-density regions. , 
Of the 2,000 million people in the underdeveloped regions, about OM 
live in the low-density regions, and abut three quarters h e  in tb 
high-&nsity r e g i ~ ~ l ~ .  1 
Thm is a high degree of correlation between the vital Mias d the inch& 
tridbd countries in both groups and the indices of the unindmtriabd 
mmtriedl. All the technologicaly developed countries have moderated thcii. 
birth rates. In the low4edty industrial countria, the birth rates tend ta 
'be somewhat higher than in the high density countries. But the contrast 
between the birth rates of ?he underdeveloped connMes the developed 
countries is very striking. Although many of the bch010giCany under& 
developed countries have very inad6quate vital statistics, the pattern of 
population growth is well emugh established to leave no donbt that in prao; 
t i d y  all these countries the birth rate ranges upward from 30 per thousand, 
It should be noted that this is not neaxsarily the "official" W birth reptertporttd 
by governments to the United Natiops; in many cases, more realistic fi- 
are derived from various estimates. At the present time, the economically 
underdeveloped areas-without respect to density of population-are exgeri- 
encing no marked change in the birth rate. 
With respect to death rates, a much more fluid situation exists. C e M  
countries of the worid-and these again are the Aost hi$dy developed tecb 
nologically-have achieved an extremely low death rate through effectin 
control of mortality-especially during the early years of life. Death rate 
ranging between eight and twelve per thousand are found in most of the 
industrial nations of tlwworld. Such death rates mean that expectation of lifd 
at birtb ranges from 60 to 70 or more years. 
Other countries of the world are in transition from traditionalIy high death 
rates (30 or 40 per thousand or even more) to rates characteristic of the 
pr %k urban-industrial nations of the West. The downward trend has proceeded most rapidly in Latin America. It is extending across Africa and Asia. 
In a few countries of the world-for example, in central Africa and in the 
more W t e d  par@ of Asia-the traditionally high-death rates are stin to be 
found But the downward trend of the death rate is virtually a worldwide 
pheaorn-. Combined with persistently high birth rates, it results in 
accelerating m a t i o n  growth. 
l h h g  the 19th century, the nations of Europe and northern America 
made r transition from the traditional pattern of slow population growth with 
high birth rate approximately in balance with a high death rate to a new 
pattern d moderate population growth with much lower birth rates and 
much lower death rates. During this transition, which occurred gradually over 
a century md a half, there was a very rapid growth of population. In these 
TABLE 1 
POPULATION PROJECTIONS TO THE YEAR 2000, FOR THE WORLD, 
CONTINENTS, AND REGIONS 
(United Nations "High" projectionsy in millions) 
Area 1950 1960 1970 2000 
..................... World Total.. 
a. ............................ ................... North Afiica.. ...... Middle and Southern Africa. 
Northem America.. ......... ,. ..... 
Asia (excluding the Asian part 
of the Soviet Union and Japan). ... 
......... Japan and Ryukyu Islands.. 
Europe (excluding the European 
part of the Soviet Union). ......... 
Northern and Western Europe. .... ................. Central Europe.. 
Southern Europe.. ............... 
Oce8ni8 ........................... 
Austxalia and New Zealand. ....... 
Pacific Islands.. .................. 
Soviet Union (Asian and European 
Pa& Combined). ................ 
Source: T%e Future Growth of WorU Popuhtion (United-Flations Publication, S d a  
No. 1958 MII 2). 
countries, the birth rate followed the death rate down after a lapse of a 
generation or so. Because of the lag in the decline of the Mrth rats, population 
growth was extremely rapid during the early years of the transition period. 
The birth rate began to decline when the people d these countries spontane- 
ously began to Mt their families to a relatively small number of 
by means of contraceptives and other forms of birth control. What caused 
them to do so is not completely understood. There has been much scholarly 
controversy concerning the dynamics of the cultural changes which unques- 
tionably took plact. It should be emphasized that the decline in the death 

rate in Europe and North America during the 19th and 20th centuries was 
a phenomenon which emerged only gradually. 
The sequence which occurred in Denmark may be regarded as illustrative 
though not necessarily typical. This is shown graphically in the foUoWing 
chart. It represents the change-over in a European country from a relatively 
stable population, with high death and high birth rates, to another level of 
relative population stability with lower death and birth rates. 
By reason of the industrial and economic revolutions mentioned earlier, 
the population of all the industria.l countries of the West was able to increase 
rapidly and live better at the same time. 
Today, the demographic situation in the underdeveloped countries is 
basically different in two respects from that which prevailed in the indus- 
trialized countries during the 19th century: 
(1) The population bases existing at the start of the industrialization 
process are in some cases very much larger. 
( 2 )  Because of the remarkable efficiency of modern public health tech- 
niques, the decline in the death rate today in many of the countries attempting 
to emerge from agrarian cultures is very much mote rapid, than it was in 
Europe in the 19th Century. While it took fifty years in Denmark to bring 
the death rate down from 20 to 14, this change took place in Ceylon for 
example, in only one year. (1947-48) The birth rates have shown no evi- 
dences of decline. The result of this is a widening gap between the two and a 
rapid increase in population, currently over 3 per cent a year in many cases. 
Some of these populations already have a high density and all of them have 
a low per capita income. 
There is a tendency in some discussions of this subject to assume that the 
demograpMc transition which occurred in Europe in the 19th century is 
some sort of a "law of nature" and that populations almost automatically go 
through such a transition. There is no evidence to support such a belief. 
A recent report of the United Nations Economic Commission for Asia and 
the Far East comments on this question, with reference to Asian countries, 
in the following terms: l 
"In the West, the demographic transition from a balance of high death 
and birth rates to a new balance of low death and birth rates was a slow and 
gradual process, in step with a similarly slow and gradual improvement in 
economic and social conditions. Per capita income, nutrition, housing and 
sanitation improved, the death rate gradually fell, and, after a time lag, the 
birth rate also fell. But in Asia and the Far East, the recent decline in mor- 
r 
tality has been rapid, because it has resulted primarily from the introduction 
of advances in medicine and in epidemic control methods which had been . -- 
developed elsewhere. In most of the countries, therefore, mortality has fallen 
l Economic Bulletin for Ash and the Far East, June 1959. 
7 
T$E BEGINNING OF A DEMOGRAPHIC CHANGE 
Source: Population Reference Bureau, Population Bulletin? Vol. X ,  No. 5, July 1954, 
pp. 60-6 1; United Nations, Demographic Yearbook? 1960. 
8 
before any major improvement in social and economic conditions bas 
occurred. If it be true that only after such a major improvement will the 
birth rate iaIl, a very long time may well elapse before the levels of living in 
the ECAFE countries are high enough to produce a new balance of low death 
and birth rates. In such circumstances the rapid rate of population growth 
which would occur in the interval would probably act as a brake on the 
cconomic development of most countries, and have a very important retarding 
effed in some cases. This ,is al l  the more true since the emigration outlet, 
which provided substantial relief to population pressure in Europe during 
its demographic tramition, is not available to Asian countries to any signis- 
cant extent," 
"However, past correlations between rising per capita income and declin- 
ing fertility are not enough to establish an inevitable relationship between 
the two." 
C H A P T E R  I 1  
Food Needs in Relation 
to Population Growth 
in Various Regions 
Although it is unfortunately true that gluts of food arise periodically in 
those areas in which there is least need for more food, it is equally true that 
a majority of the people now living on the earth do not have enough to eat, 
and unless the present rate of expansion in food production is greatly accel- 
erated, their hunger will not be appreciably assuaged within the next decades. 
Thus,'in the light of present population trends, the efforts now being made to 
solve the world's problem of hunger are not realistic. 
In the world picture of food needs and population growth, these four 
features deserve to be highlighted: 
(i) Demographic changes take place slowly. There is no prospect that 
there will be a sudden decline in the world birth rate. Barring catastrophes, 
thcn is a good prospect that the world death rate will decline still further. 
Hence, during the immediate fuaue extending over the next few decades, 
there is every prospect that population growth will continue at a rapid-rate. 
(ii) A vast increase in the production of food to meet the inevitable 
population increases over the next decades is imperative if appalling disasters 
are to be averted and the possibility of an orderly and constructive transition 
to a satisfactory, stable balance between food and population is to be assured. 
(iii) If such a transition is to be achieved, the magnitude of the operation 
must be recognized. It is all very well to say that "much more food can be 
produced." To create the technology and the education and the storage and 
transportation facilities and everything else required to b ~ g  this transition 
to pass is an operation on a scale far vaster than anything contemplated in 
plans either of individual governments or of the cooperative undertakings 
now contemplated by United Nations agencies. 
(iv) Indefinite multiplication of people on a finite planet is impossible. 
If the rate of population growth which is occurring in some areas of the 
world today were to be applied to the total human population of the planet, 
within only two or three centuries the entire land d a c e  of the earth would 
be covered with human beings. 
There is a definite limit to the number of human beings that the earth can 
accommodate. It would not be redistic, at the present stage of scientific 
development, to take into account space travel and other technological ad- 
vances as factors offering a possible sdution to the problem. If there is ever 
to be enough and to spare for all-if the promises of security, and freedom 
from hunger and fear are to be realized-stabilization of population will 
eventually be unavoidable. How long it can be postponed without the gravest 
consequences is one of the most important questions facing humanity today. 
The question of the amount of food necessary to feed future populations 
hinges on the balance of births and deaths around the world. The critical 
area is represented by the 2,000 million people living in the high-birth-rate, 
technologically-underdeveloped countries. Given the many efforts to increase 
their food supplies, what is the prospect for population growth in these coun- 
tries in the future, and how accurately may this growth be predicted? 
During the 19th century, several attempts were made to predict popula- 
tion growth by applying an allembracing mathematical formula, and similar 
ideas have recently been revived, but the results so far achieved serve to 
demonstrate that no generalized formula can anticipate what impact fortui- 
tous events such as, for example, the depression of the 1930's and the subse- 
quent economic recovery, will have on the birth rate. Barring catastrophe it 
can be assumed that the low death rates of the industrial countries will remain 
relatively stable; but catastrophes can happen and these could profoundly 
alter future population growth. 
It may be stated, however, that the d35culties of population prediction 
are greatest when an attempt is made to predict the population growth of any 
particular country. Predictions concerning the regional and world situation 
are likely to be more reliable since local perturbations in vital rates may 
not affect the results to such a large extent. 
Models of population growth may be based on various assumptions con- 
ceming changes in b i d  and death rates. These models at least afford some 
insight into the order of magnitude of changes which may be expected during 
the next forty years. If no major unexpected factors, whether favourable or 
unfavourable, upset the foreseeable trend of population growth, future 
developments should be as follows: World population is now about the 
3,000 million mark. It increased by over 400 million in the 1950 decade. It 
is estimated to increase by about 600 million in the 1960 decade, or at the 
rate of about 60 million persons per year; at this rate, world population will 
double in about forty years-reaching 6,000 million before the year 2000. 
1 
~ ~ d a i t ~ f ~ l l i n g ~ t h ~ l l t e r i n m a n ~ ~ ~ t m i i t i ~ ~ ~ a i g ~ ~ b i r t h n ~  
the popnlstion in the yaar 2000 could conceivably exceed this fieure bji 
1,m ldmm. 
Tho rate8 of popplatim growth w w  now d t  
hnpmved ecummic caditiom for the people of the 
tries; in fact, the reverse is the case. During the next deca&, if 
tremis u. miutabd the world will tend to beotxm divided e v m q  
lwmbdly ink, two distinct grcwps, as follow: 
high levels d living, where effective fextility regolatian exists 
This includes the whale of Europef the Soviet Union, North Americas $&# 
tempexate-zone countries d Latin America, Ooeania and Japan. 
7 
(ii) The ~ o g r a p ~  1mtabl0, hrgrdy mWce1evel  mmtries 
that are now struggling toward economic dtvelopment; almost two thirds d 
the waid's pmp1t live in these countzies. In mwe d them doer there =ern 
to have been any efftcti~e ltort to reduce f a t y ,  except on the part bf 
numerically insi- mSnoaes of the popnlati&n, This grohP of d- 
tries includes dl non1Soviet Asia (exapt J a p  and Israel), tropical Latin 
America, and most d A f k h  The ''rising e ~ t i 0 1 l s ' '  that swept @e world 
at the m l y  1950's an in danger of Kmg extinguished by the new mulSitgdm 
born fnto very marginal conditions of Buing, and needing to be fed, 
and h d .  
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The areas of the circles represent the total population of the world. If present t r e e  
continue, 9.4 percent of the world's population will be found in Latin Amerika in 2m 
as compared with about 7 percent Way. 
As a result of the very large differences in rate of increase, the proportions 
of the population living in various parts of the world arc expected to change 
significantly. According to the United Nations medium assumption, Asia's 
share is likely to increase from 55.2 per cent in 1950 to 62 per cent in 2000 
and Latin America's from 6.5 per cent to more'than 9 per cent, while 
Africa's share would remain constant at about 8 per cent. The share of 
Europe including the USSR, would decline from 23.0 per cent in 1950 to 
15 per cent, and that of northern America from nearly 7 to about 5 per cent. 
Oceania's proportion would probably remain at its present 0.5 per cent. 
The population of Asia is growing very rapidly: according to United 
Nations' projections, Asia which now has more than 1,600 million people 
(excluding the Asian part of the USSR) may have 2,000 million by 1975 
and 3,900 million by 2000. This estimate is based on the assumption that 
mortality will continue to decline but that fertility wil l  remain at its present 
high level until 1975 and then gradually decline. 
The report of the United Nations Economic Commission for Asia and the 
Far East (ECAFE) mentioned earlier, indicates that if present trends in 
growth continue, the population of the region will nearly double in the next 
thirty years and will then nearly equal the entire world population today. 
Within the next two decades, increasing population pressure could corn- 
p M y  frustrate the rising hopes for a new way of life among the people d 
the ECAFE ~epion. Governments are hard pressed to find the resources to 
PERCENT POPULATION INCREASES BY MAJOR REGIONS, 
1900 TO 2000 
The United Nations projections to the year 2000 show a relatively small increase in 
population in western Europe and North America and the greatest increases in Latin 
Amaka and Asia. 
Source: Population Reference Bureau, Population Bulletin, Vol. XV, No. 2, March 
1959, p. 28. 
stimulate t c o ~ c  development so that the legitimate demands fords-i 
p a & a o o ~ 0 1 3 c a n b e m e t .  
Table 2 oorapams the population of the ECAFE region with t h a w  
mst@ r@ms d the nodd. The figores are Berived from ~~ 
WP3.m these are deemed to be adequate, or are h a t e s  based on 
c o d  by the United Nations. The &ares cited for meinlend 
bra been compiled firrm various mleaws of the Governmat. 
China ( m M d  and Taiwan) and India, the world's 
these, bdomsia, Japan and Pakistan, each with 80 to 90 
have larget popdati01ls than any othrr nations 0 t h  world &apt the 
States a d  the Wet Union. 
Mi& b i d  rates rind raphny falling death rates account for €he 
ratt of ppulatim & I C ~  throu&od most of the region. Japan is 
industrial nation, with birth and death rates similar to 
C 4 3 I S l ~ e ~  dh than the ECAPB C O t I i l b k ~ .  S h  1948-1949, thc d 1 
groWta in Japan has cbcmmd nnda the impact of the falling birth. rate. firs-!. 
higher levels of litezacg awi iadustriahation arc certainly-factam in tbb ':. 
rapid decline ia births. : C C 1 
 he 'eoonoani@ impfiations d ~ s i a * s  rapid growth tiend are geriow rina - 
mast of the countries of the region have low income, bw literacy, Ihhitd'i. 
aittivata~ ha. limited  capita^ nawcts, zmc~ few tieve10ptd ~ 8 -  mii 
suurces other than land. 
The ECAPB Repart above-mentioned states a  tion on which, it con- 
siders, is 9aEd for all but a few e p m l y  popdated cduntries, and dor- 
twmtely applies with special force to those with a relatidy dense popbe 
tion: it is that, other things being qmd, a country with a higher rate 05. 
population grow must make a kger development effort (which hd& 
investing moie and abstainiag morc from mdsm@n) in order to oMain 
a given rate of increase h . p  capita income. Then is even a that tbe 
development e&rt will not be large emugh to ofEset the e&ct d a rapid 
popMon growth and tbgt pcr q * t a  income win dtcrease.* ' . 
WfinqprdtoChina (mdnland),itamtobetrosthatUIGmm 
is gmmbg quits rapidly aad that this will continue in the immediats future 
udem catastrophic events intervene to raise the death rate. 
The situation with respect to the world's'next largest camtry, hdia, hi 
much mom clearly dehed. Reports by the Indian governmmt, the World , 
Bank and the Ford Fmdation c1ea~Sy show the nature of the dilemma which 
c m t s  tbfs agrarian natia ~~g toward an ~conomic break-throagb. 
All these 'surveys (=Onat hat rapid population growth represents a handicap . 
to the success of p b  to improve the economic conditions of the Indian 
people. 
The situation in Africa and Latin America differs in scale and in other 
Other countries: 
Mexico. - - - 46 13 3.3 125 50 ................... 
France - - - 19 12 .................... 0.6 39 68 
United Kingdom. ....,...... - T- - 16 12 0.4 26 71 
United States.. ............. - - - 25 9 1.6 28 71 
* Birth and death rates are expressed' per 1,000 of the population per 3,4,7,8 and 10 in the Economic Bulletin for As& and the For Easr, June 
year. The annual rates of natural increase are given in percent of total 1959 (op. cit.). They are either official statistics where these are adequate 
population. Infant mortality rates are per 1,000 live births per year. or they are estimates based on United Nations models. Data for main- 
Source: The data for the ECAFE countries are modified from Tables 2, land China were compiled from various relaam of the Govcmment. 
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ECAFE Countries : 
AfghBniStan ................ 13.0 20 144 - - - - ............ British Borneo.. 1.1 ' - - 46 29 1.7 253 29 
Burma. .................... 19.9 29 232 44 29 1.5 221 34 
Cambodia. ................ 4.4 25 220 ' 47 23 2.4 179 40 
Ceylon. .................... 8.9 136 586 42 14 2.8 128 54 
China: Mainland.. ......... 621.2 64 568 37 17 2.0 - - 
Taiwan. ............ 9.2 257 1,055 45 10 3.5 78 55 
Federation of Malaya.. ..... 6.2 48 282 44 12 3.2 79 59 
Hong Kong.. .............. 2.4 - 38 8 3.0 - - 
India ...................... 387.3 118 245 42 29 1.3 200 35 
Indonesia. ................. 84.0 56 475 43 24 1.9 192 39 
Iran. ...................... 18.9 12 113 - - - - 
Japan. .................... 90.0 243 1,783 19 8 1.1 42 66 
Korea,Southern ............ 21.8 225 1,093 - - - - - 
Laos. ..................... 1.4 6 142 46 28 1.8 221 34 
Nepal.. ................... 8.7 62 280 - - - - - 
Pakistan. .................. 83.6 88 343 50 30 2.0 200 35 
Philippines. ................ 22.3 74 347 49 21 2.8 166 44 
Singapore. ................. 1.3 - 48 9 3.9 49 ( 
Thailand. .................. 20.7 40 265 47 23 2.4 179 w 
Viet-Nam (Southern 






(Estimated 1954-56) Country (in millions) Area I land 
- ~ b s t i l l h t h a i e x p ~ ~ s t a g e s r m d e n j d  
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Relation of demographic trends to social and economic factors 
Despite many attempts by students of population to define and measure 
"over-population" and "under-population", no generally accepted 
have been devised. Population density, while it is sometimes a us 
of population pressure on agricultural resources, does not take into 
the relative abundance or availability through commerce of other 
resources, the extent of industrial development, or the degree of technolog- 
ical progress and other factors which are important determinants of welfare 
of the population. In recent years, attention has turned increasingly toward 
analysis of the relation between rates of population growth and factors 
influencing economic development, particularly for the underdeveloped 
wuntries where the need for emnomic progress has taken on such impor- 
tance. 
Certain trends are occurring throughout the world which complicate the 
social and economic situation. The first is a decline in the percentage of 
agricultural population, rapid in the developed regions, slower in the under- 
developed regions. The second is an increase in urban population, propor- 
tionately dower in the developed countries than in the underdeveloped 
wunbries. Third is the decline in importance of intercontinental migration 
since the early part of the 20th centmy, as contrasted with its great impor- 
tance in the 19th century. Fourth is the relatively rapid decline of death 
rates in the underdeveloped regions in recent years compared with the slower 
previous decline in the developed regions, without comparable declines in 
b i i  rates* 
The efIects of rapid population growth compared with slow or moderate 
growth are several: I 
(i) rapid population growth tends to increase the pressure of agricultural 
population on land which may already be densely settled, further wmpli- 
cating the effects of excessive fragmentation and l e d  holdings so small as to 
be inefficient; 
(ii) rapidly increasing population adds to the urgent need for capital 
investment to equip the growing labour force productively; 
(iii) a high rate of growth adversely affects the abiity of a population 
- to realize needed investments in productive equipment. ~ddit ioG to the 
population in labout-surplus countries do not increase proportionately the 
capacity to produce, but they do increase the necessity to consume and they 
put heavy demands on limited capital to meet social needs that are not imme- 
diately productive in economic terms but are nevertheless essential (schools 
and hospitals, for example). Consequently, under these conditions, popula- 
tion growth tends to reduce the amount of capital that can be invested in 
productive equipment; 
(iv) the problem of saving and investing enough out of a limited annual 
income is made even more difficult by the need to provide for dependents. 
High birth rates result in a population with a relatively low percentage of 
people in the effectively productive age groups, so that, on the average, each 
pereon of working age wil l  have to support a large number of dependents. 
Thus, under conditions common to the underdeveloped regions, exces- 
sively rapid poplation growth tends to retard economic growth. Code and 
H m e P  estimate that if India's b i i  rate should begin to decline by 1966 
Code, W e y  J. and Edgar M. Hoover. Population Growth and Economic Development in Low- 
Inmme Countrks, Princeton Univcdty Press, 1958. - 
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C H A P T E R  I11 
Cities and Food 
* 
The agricultural revolution, the increasing power to control epidemic 
diseases, and improved transportation have all combined to usher in a new 
era in the growth of cities. The city, in turn, has had far-reaching influences 
on the quantities and qualities of both mouths and calories-and its influences 
have greater and greater force today, in the economically "developed" as 
well as the economidy underdeveloped countries. 
As has been pointed out above, world population is growing at an un- 
precedented rate today; and the rate of growth of urban populations is even 
greater. Today, over 20 per cent of the world's people, or more than 500 
million live in urban areas of 20,000 or more inhabitants, compared with 
only about 2 per cent in 1800. Over three-fifths of today's city dwellers 
(1 3 per cent of total world population) live in cities of 100,000 or more. 
The United Nations Report on the World Social Situation, 1957', referring 
to the sudden spurt of urban growth in underdeveloped countries in recent 
years, points out that by 1950 Asia had one-third of the world's total large- 
city (100,000 or more) population. Comparing the trends of urban and 
rural population growth in various parts of the world, the Report points out 
that whereas in the majority of the less-developed countries the rural popu- 
lation has also increased, though at a slower rate, the absolute size of the 
rural population in many of the more developed countries has remained 
stationary or even dedined. 
In 1950, the world's major regions of industrial urban settlement were 
Australasia, northwestern Europe, northern America, northeast Asia, and 
southern South America. These areas included about 25 per cent of total 
world population but 52 per cent of the total living in cities of 100,000 or 
more. Australasia was the most heavily urbanized, with 47 per cent in cities 
of that size. 
During the past twenty years, the USSR has been undergoing extensive 
urbanization. In 1959, 48 per cent of the USSR population was living in 
cities, compared with only 32 per cent in 1939. In twenty years, the urban 
population grew by almost 40 million, an increase of two-thirds. In 1949, 
23 per cent of the total population and almost 50 per cent of the urban popu- 
lation lived in cities of 100,000 or more. 
-- 
8 United Nations, Buteau of Sodal Mairs, Report on the World Sock3 Sitauaf&n, Sales No: 1957 
IV.3. B/CN.5/324/Rsv.l ST/SOA/33. 
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It has been estimated that 20 million mainland Chinese migrated from 
rural to urban areas between 1949 and 1956. Mainland China's inland dtbs 
have experienced a remarkable rate of growth. Estimates indicate that in the 
western provinces alone, Lanchow grew from 200,000 in 1950 fS! 684000 
in 1956; Paotow from 90,000 in 1949 to 430,000 in 1957 and Kalgan from 
270,000 in 1949 to 1,050,000 in 1957. Furthermore, there is a heavy con- 
centration of mainland China's urban population in the larger cities. 
In some regions of the world, a single large city-usually the capital city-- 
contains a high proportion both of a nation's total population and of its urban 
population. In many countries, well over 50 per cent of alI the urban popula- 
tion is concentrated in the capital city. This is especially true of several Latin 
American countries. More than one-fourth of all Latin Americans live in 
cities of 20,000 or more and about one-fifth live in cities of 100,000 or Toy, 
The consensus of competent opinion appears to be that in the world ash 
whole, the trend toward the city is by no means at an end. Even in the highly , 
urbanized indnstrial nations of the Western world, it appears that the pro- 
portion of the population residing in major metropolitan agglomerations will 
continue to grow. The rural population, which is by no means entirely devoted 
to agricultural pursuits at the present time, constitutes less th& 20 per cent 
of the total; the farming population is less than 10 per cent. 
In'thc agrarian countries, an overwhelming majority still lives on the land. , 
There, employment is to a large extent inadequate and unproductive, so the 
present large drift to the city can be expected to continue. The effect of this 
migration will largely depend on the speed with which industry will bc able , 
to create jobs. 
How - a afEecQ food sopplies 
! 
The persistent and accelerating movement of population towards the cities j 
increases the already complicated problem of hunger in the economically 
less-developed regions d the world. This fact is significant for the following 
reasons: 
In the first place, an increase in the supply of murketable food i s  needed. 
A greater output of food does not necessarily result in a greater surplus for 
the urban population, and in countries where farming is still at subsisten~ce 
level the farm population, itself increasing, may consume much of its ia- 
creased output rather than selling it. Therefore, the production of food most 1 
rise considerably faster than the growth of the farm population if there is 16 
be enough food for urban markets. 
Secondly, more food must be taken to the cities, and for this, better tram 
portation facilties are needed. In many cases these are practically nap. 
existent or are totally inadequate to meet the new demands made on them. 
Thirdly, facilities for storing and preserving food must be set up, particu- 
larly where large year-to-year fluctuations in crops make it diflicult to secure 
a steady supply of food. At present there is a high proportion of waste in the 
underdeveloped regions and stored food is often spoiled by rats, mice and 
insects. 
Lastly, food supply is not the only problem connected with urbanization, 
housing, health and civic services are needed, and capital is often diverted 
from the production and distribution of food to social development pro- 
grammes. 
The United Nations Report on the World Social Situation4 sums up the 
problem as follows: 
"Ideally, productivity in agriculture would rise at a rate meeting the cities' 
growing demands for food as well as the demands of export markets while 
permitting the release of agricultural workers at a rate meeting the rising 
demand for labur in industry and services. In practice the transition does 
not proceed so smoothly, and in many countries today something quite 
different is happening: productivity is hardly increasing at all, while masses 
of rural workers come to the cities looking for jobs that either do not exist 
or from which they are barred by illiteracy and lack of skills." 
C H A P T E R  IV 
Present Food Supplies 
and Estimated Future Requirements 
~ f o o a ~ ~  
There are vast dBerenees in die@ throughout a e  world, These died 
such factors as .types of crops8hd li-k produd; food preferences, level 
of living, and amam (d trfpdb. 
The wmmtm pa- in most L X ) ~ ~  is a .basic reliance on ataple cmals . 
and starchy f d ;  These are supplemented, h e n  b~k~umers can afford 
them, with the more expensive, nutritionally protective foods. As 'incorws rise 
above subsistence level, the more expensive foods are first added to diets and : 
the= begin to replace the staple foods. - 
Some idea of the imbalance in the relation between the population and 
the food production of various regions can be gathered from Table 3, which 
shows the relative shares of the world% agricultural production (nearly 90 
per a n t  of which consists of food and food crops) and of the world's popu- 
lation ih the various regions for the year 1958. 
Most information on national diets consists of estimates of average food 
supplies available per person. In considering the information, two things 
mwt be kept in mind. F i  the data that they are based on are often scanty 
or inadequate, so that the results are, at best, an approximation. Second, ' 
extensive studies have shown that even in the best fed wnntries of the world, 
thae are large groups of people with low incomes whose diet is deficient in 
protective foods. Therefore, when a country's average per capita food soppiy 
is barely adequate, a large proportion of the population is subsisting on a 
sub-&arpind diet. Despite these limitations, existing figures do provide a 
useful measme of the pattern of food consumption throughoat the world. 
By any standard, diets are poorest in the Far East, the region which con- ' 
Eains over half the world's population. Throughout most of this region, the 
people have a daily average per capita calorie intake considerably below the , 
standard estimated by FAO as adequate, taking into accwnt the climate and 
physical size of the inhabitants. It is estimated tbat between 300-500 millbn 
of the population in this region is under-nourished and an additional 500 
million do not get enough food of the right kind. The percentage of c a l h  
obtained ftom grains, starchy roots and sugar is an inverse indicabr of 1 
t 
quality of diet, and this 6gure is extremely high, in the Far ( 
per cent). Consumption of meats, vegetables, fruits, pulses, and , 
foods is correspondingly low. In terms of minimal adequate di 
the situation in this area is far from satisfactory. 
TABLE 3 
REGIONAL SHARBS OF THE WORLD'S AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION 
A N D  POPULATION FOR THE YEAR 1958 
- - 
I '  of 
Agn'dtural Per Capita 
prdction Population prodsrction 
REGION (per cent) (per cent) ( WorU aversge - 100) 
Western Europe. ....... 15 
EastemEurope.. ...... 17 
(in& USSR) 
Northern America.. .... 21 
Latin America.. ....... 8 
Far East... ........... 28 
Near East.. ........... 4 
Africa. ............... 4 
ocalia. .............. 3 
WORLD TOTAL... ...... 100 
Source: Estimates supplied by FAO. 
While the energy content of the diet in Africa is higher than in the Far 
East, the quality of the diet is poorer due to the heavy dependence on starchy 
foods. Diets in the Near East and Latin America are generally better than 
those in the Far EaSt and in Africa. Many of these countries have an average 
per capita intake of over 3000 calories; but in other countries the diet is 
below this level. The greatest need of these regions is for proteins of high 
nutritive value. In the rest of the world, particularly the industrialized coun- 
tries, the situation is much better. Intake of calories averaged about 3000 
per capita and the proportion derived from grain, starchy roots and sugar 
ranges from 40 per cent in North America to about 63 per cent in Europe. 
A comparison of estimated levels of per capita consumption of food for 
immediate pre-war, early post-war, and recent periods is shown in Table 4. 
Two points are readily apparent from that table. The diets in the 
developed and undek-developed countries are widely merent in all three 
respects. While the developed countries have surpassed pre-war levels of 
calories and proteins, the under-developed countries are still below prewar 
levels of proteins, and only just above pre-war levels of calories. This is in 
spite of the great efforts that have been made to increase the world's food 
supplis. 
How far are existing levels below desirable levels? Exact measurement is 
dillicult because while there is general agreement on what charagterkes 
good and poor diets, there is no widespread agreement on nutritionatyequire- 
ments or standards except for calories. 
TABLE 4 
LEVELS OF DAILY PER CAPITA CONSUMPTION OF FOOD 
BY REGIONS AND GROUPS OF COUNTRIBS 
Source: Sulcbatme, P. W. (1%1), "The World's Hunger and Future Needs in Food Supplies," The 
JoMEal of the Royal S t c l W d  S&&y, Series A ((feaaal); Vol. 124, page 477. 
* T h a d r o t v p I o o r m ~ ~ ~ & ~ F ~ ~ t , P J a a r ~ A f r i ~ a n d L a t i n ~ ( d ~ c a p t ~  
Piab w\fllW). Tb Group II cou~trka indude EWope, n o ~ - ~ c a ,  Riwa Piab camtrica< 
and Oceania These groups cormpond fairly clwcly to the under-developed and dewlopad: 
countria of the world. 
#a 
However, in recent studies conducted in FAO certain targets have been set 
for daily per capita consumption of calories and animal proteins and the 
comparison of these targets with estimated actual levels of consumption 
affords at least an approximate indication of the extent of present deficiencies. 
For calories, these targets are based on the widely accepted PAO calorie 
requirement scale. Those for animal proteins are based on the consideration 
to bring the quality of the diets in the under-developed countries somewhat 
I 
closer to the levels enjoyed by the developed countries in so far as this is 
feasible and advisable under, the conditions of the underdeveloped coun- 





war war Receut. 
8 6 8 ,  
15 14 14 
15 15 11 
30 29 25 
27 31 36 
B 60 66 
'65 65 62 
10 8 9 
33 40 44 
18 18 20 
Cdork~ 
1-e 
Re -  Post- 
mw war Recent 
FarEast ............ 2120 1910 2070 
........... NeatEslst 2320 2190 2470 
Af& .............. 2180 2100 2360 
....... LatinAmerica 2140 23$U 2470 
Europe ............. 2850 2870 3040 
NorthernAmeri ca... 3140 3120 3120 
........... Oceania.. 3270 3180 3250 
.......... Group I*  2130 1960 2150 
......... Group US.  2910 2850 3060 




war wm Recent 
63 54 56 
76 70 76 
61 61 61 
66 67 67 
85 91 88 
89 PO 93 
97 95 84 
63 56 58 
86 91 90 
72 66 68 
regions: Far Bast, Near East, Africa, and Latin America except the River 
Plate counb5es. 
While the present averages of consumption of calories in the Near East, 
Africa and Latin America are at or near the target figures, there is a deficiency 
of some 10 per cent in the Far Eastern region. Deficiencies of animal protein 
consumption are however more serious, and this is so not only in the Far 
East, but in the Near East and Africa as well. 
TABLE 5 
PRESENT LEVELS AND MINIMUM TARGETS FOR DAILY 
PER CAPITA CONSUMPTION OF TYPES OF FOODS I N  
UNDER-NOURISHED ARBAS OF THE WORLD 
Source: Sufrhatme P. V.  (op. cit.), pp. 498 and 504. 
+ Excluding Rivler Plate countries. 
The "index" shown in this table represents the proportionate inmase in 
per capiha consumption required to achieve a minimum level of adequate 
diet at the least cost, within realistic possib'ities of change. The data indicate 
that the level of diet in the under-developed countries of the world would 
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Animal 
Protein. 8 t5 
Cgrammes) 
hdex. . . . 100 141 






A number of factors have an important bearing on the trends in demand 
for foodstu5. Probably the most important factor influencing the total world 
demand is that of population growth. The average growth of world population 
from 1950-59 has been estimated at 1.7 per cent per year, but this rate varies 
by regions from less than 1 per cent in Europe to nearly 3 per cent in Middle 
America (Central America, Mexico, and the Caribbean region). 
The age and sex composition of population also influence food require- 
ments since the needs of children, women, and men vary. The large propor- 


















average calorie requirements to some extent. But this is probably outweighed 
by the fact that children and young adults both need large amounts of 
proteins. 
A third factor, as we have seen, is urbanization, and a fourth i@he effect 
of rising incomes on food consumption. 
Post-war experience has demonstrated the accuracy of the 1943 Hot 
Springs Conference declaration that "The fist cause of hunger and malnu- 
trition is poverty." The demand for food at existing levels of inwme in the 
under-developed countries often does not produce diet which is sufficiently 
nutritious. 
TABLE 6 
ESTIMATED PERCENTAGE OF CALORIES DERIVED PROM 
CEREALS, STARCHY ROOTS, AND SUGARS FOR 
AREAS AND SELECTED COUNTRIES 
Area Per cent Area Per cent 
Far East.. .............. 80 
China (mainland). ...... 83 
India.. ............... 76 
. Near East.. ............. 72 ................. Egypt 77 ................ Turkey 75 
.................. Africa 74 .............. Morocco 75 ............... Nigeria 74 
. Latin America.. ......... 64 
Argentina.. ........... 51 
Mexico ............... 72 
...... Europe and USSR.. 63 
Federal Republic 
of Germany.. ....... 50 
United Kingdom.. ..... 48 
USSR ................ 72 
Northern America.. ...... 40 
Canada ............... 43 
USA .................. 40 
............... Oceania... 48 
Australia .............. 49 
New Zealand.. ........ 43 
Under-nourished areas. ... 78 
Well-nodshed areas. ..... 57 
World .................. 70 
Source: Sukhatme (op. cit.), page 493. 
Studies by FAO* indicate a remarkable uniformity in the relation between 
income and expenditure on food over a wide range of countries at Merent 
levels of inwme and economic development, despite wide variation in cul- 
tures and food habits. In economies where most of the population is at the 
margin of subsistence, the main effect of an increase in income will be an 
increased demand for food. In such countries, an increase of one per cent 
in income leads to an increase of between 0.7 and 0.8 per cent in demand 
for food. This ratio may be referred to as the "income elasticity of food." 
4 FAO, State of Food and Agriculture, 1957, pp. 70-110; 1960, p. 113. 
But as average income increases, the demand for food does not increase in 
the same proportion. Therefore, if the prognunmes for economic develop 
ment in the under-developed countries should succeed in raising per capita 
income for any length of time, the induced demand for food would eventually 
abate at a higher level of consumption. None the less, this immediate in- 
creased demand is an important consideration in the development of coun- 
tries with low incomes. 
In the more developed countries, the "income elasticity of food" described 
in the preceding paragraph, is about 0.4; for grains and starchy foodstuffs, 
it is lower stin, and even assumes a negative value. Thus, an increase in 
per capita incomes in these countries leads to a relative decline in demand 
for basic foods, and contributes to the food surpluses that have appeared in 
some relatively advanced countries. 
The diBculty of obtaining satisfactory nutrition under low-income con- 
ditions is indicated by the figures in Table 7 which shows the number of hours 
a worker receiving the average manufacturing wage rate in specified coun- 
tries must work to earn the cost'of one day's food for one person at three 
dietary levels. The first dietary level is representative of economically under- 
developed countries; the second, of countries at an early stage of industrial- 
ization, the third, of economically advanced countries. Each diet is composed 
and priced in terms of food customarily eaten in the s-ed country. 
Clearly, the more nutritious and expensive diets are beyond the means of 
the average factory worker with a family in the economically under-developed 
TABLE 7 
NUMBER OF HOURS OF WORK REQUIRED FOR A N  AVERAGB 
FACTORY WORKER TO BARN THE COST (AT 1953 
RETAIL PRICES) OF THREE REPRBSENTATIVB 
DIETS FOR ONE PERSON FOR ONE DAY, 
IN SELECTED COUNTRIES 
Calories. .............................. 
Griunmes animal protein.. .............. 






Denmark. .......................... ............................. Canada 
United States.. ...................... 
Diet I Diet 2 Diet 3 
Source: FAO, State of Food and Agriculture, 1957, p. 108. 
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countries. Moreover, since the incomes of factory wage-earners are usually 
higher than the incomes of farmers and farm workers, and the latter make up 
the bulk of the labour force in under-developed countries, the ql~ulations 
** 
of hours of work shown in the table may well be optimistic. 
The i.qprtance of income in determining both the level and pattern of 
food consumption indicates the essential comexion between economic 
development and progress in nutrition. As the 1957 FAU report on the State 
of Food and Agriculture points out, no substantial improvement in nutrition 
is likely until productivity is raised and the general run of people in a country 
earn higber incomes, although there may be some improvement for the 
population as a whole and major improvements for special groups such as 
expectant and nursing mothers, and children of school and preschool age. 
Such improvements may be brought about, in the, absence of inwme changes, 
by such means as nutritional education and special welfare schemes. 
Pqmlatim p w t h  and food mqukmemts 
In considering how population growth affects the need for food, it should 
be made clearthat the statement on page 25 above, that "the level of diet in 
the under-developed countries of the world would have to be raised by a 
third" if minimum dietary targets are to be achieved, applies only to existing 
population levels and does not take into account the additional food which 
will be needed for growing populations. When PAO'S First World Food Suwey 
was published in 1946, the growth of world population was estimated at about 
1 per cent per year. The current estimates quoted above show an average 
rate of 1.7 per cent in the world as a whole during the 195(Ys, and the future 
projections indicate even more rapid growth. In the developed countries, 
which are already enjoying adequate average levels of nutrition, population 
is e x m d  to increase 28 per cent over the 1958 level by 1980. On the other 
hand, the population of the under-developed countries as a group is expected 
to increase by 56 per cent. 
The estimates shown in Table 8 indicate that food supplies in the under- 
developed countries must more than double between 1958 and 1980 if the 
increasing population is to be fed at a minimum adequate nutritional stand- 
ard. This means an annual average rate of increase of nearly 3% per cent in 
food supplies. This is a higher rate than the average annual increase in food 
production over the past seven years in these countries. 
Although annual increases of food production for the world as a whole 
have been greater than this over the past few years, much of the increase has 
taken place in the economically developed countries. Moreover, although in 
under-developed countries, agricultural production has increased only some- 
what faster than population growth, the situation is entirely different in the 
economically developed countries. Food supplies in countries which were 
TABLE 8 
PERCENTAGE INCREASES OF FOOD SUPPLY NEEDED DURING 1958-1980 
TO MEET ANTICIPATED REQUIREMENTS I N  VARIOUS 
REGIONS OF THE WORLD 
Total increase 
Per capita of food supply, 
1958-1980 Rate of 
projected f~zp"{ required to QHIU(QI 
population presently meet tmget increase Recent annual 
growth required to and population needed rate of increase 




btin America.. .... 
Far East.. ......... 
Near East.. ........ 
............ Africa. 
Developed Countries ............ World. 
.Based on United Natiom "Medium" projections as shown in "The Future Growth of World 
Population" (United Nations Publications, Sales No. 58 MI1 2). 
b Computed fiom averages of food production in 1952153 and 1959160, FAO, State of Food and 
Agricultrcre, 1960, and FA0 Yearbook, 1959. 
a Excluding River Plate countries. 
Including River Plate countries. 
a Excluding mainland China. 
already adequately fed have increased, and, particularly in North America, 
surplus food stocks have developed despite sustained efforts to control 
production. 
Thus, both in quality and quantity, the nutritional gap between the eeo- 
nomically less advanced regions and the economically advanced countries 
has tended to widen. 
These trends have been the result of the paradoxical supply and demand 
situation in developed and under-developed countries. In the economically 
advanced countries, agricultural output can be expanded easily because of 
the high level of technology and relatively abundant capital available to 
farmers. With food consumption already at a high level, increases in per 
capita income go mainly into non-agricultural goods. This, coupled with a 
moderate population growth, results in slow growth in markets for agricul- 
tural commodities, so surplus stocks have tended to accumulate. 
In the lessdeveloped oounkies, agricultural output is increased only with 
dBiculty. With a rapidly growing population, demand is rising rapidly and, 
wpile a good deal of any increased income is spent on food, the low level of 
income precludes purohase at commercial prices of agricultural commodities : 
produced by the advanced countries. Free or "cut-rate" distriiution of food 
from the food-surplus areas could disrupt the agricultural economjes of the 
un&r-developed areas, setting off a chain of reactions which woad not be 
useful to discuss here. 
Agricultural policies of the .developed and under-developed countries 
TABLE 9 
GRAIN AREA, PRODUCTION A N D  YIELDS 1948-52 A N D  
1956-58, FOR REGIONS OF THE WORLD 
(Area-million hectares; production-million tons; yield-tons per hectare.) 
Percentage 
1948-52 1956-58 increase 
World Area .............. 609 665 
......... Production 699 91 1 
Yield.. ............ 1.15 1.37 19 
............ Europe (exc. USSR) Area.. 72 ......... Production 108 
............ Yield.. 1.50 
............ Northern America Area.. 104 
Production.. ....... 169 





Area... ........... 28 
........ Production. 31 
Yield. ............. 1 .I 1 
Area. ............. 22 
Production. ........ 24 ............ Yield.. 1.09 
Area .............. 231 
Production ......... 252 
Yield. ............. 1.09 
Area. ............. 41 ........ Production. 27 
Yield .............. 1.52 
Oceania Area .............. 6.3 
Production.. ....... 6.8 
Yield .............. 1.08 
USSR* Area .............. 105 ........ Production. - 81 
Yield. ............. 0.77 
Includes pulses. 
Source: FA0 Protikctbn Yearbook, Volume 13. 
reflect the situation just outlined. In the more advanced countries, these 
policies have been aimed largely towards adjusting agricultural production 
to the level of domestic demand and commercial exports and towards 
bringing the incomes of farmers more into line with those of other occupa- 
tions. These policies, however, have not been completely successful in 
achieving either aim. The result has been a trend towards lower relative 
farm incomes and unused production. 
In the less-developed countries, agricultural policies have, in contrast, 
been aimed largely at increasing agricultural output through capital invest- 
ment and increasing productivity. Price policies have been established largely 
to protect consumers and avoid inflation, although the use of producer 
incentive prices is now beginning to encourage increased output. 
Prospeebr for inerraslng food production 
The levels of food production per capita in various regions of the world 
since before the war are shown in Table 10. 
A quick inspection of this table might suggest optimistic conclusions 
regarding the trend of per capita food production in recent years, since world 
per capita production is now well above the prewar average. However, of 
the under-developed regions (Latin America, the Far East, the Near East 
and Africa), only in the Near East has per capita fwd production exceeded 
prewar levels in the last three years. 
What are theprospects for the under-developed areas? Region by region, 
the prospects over the next decade appear to be as follows: 
Near East 
This area as a whole now produces most of the food it consumes. Except 
in the case of the United Arab Republic and Libya, there are no substantial 
imports of food. Consumption per capita in terms of calories per day ranges 
from a little over 2000 in Iran to over 2700 in Israel, the latter being the 
only country with a fairly high quality of diet. In other countries, grain 
products-mainly wheat-are the mainstay of the di&. However, consumption 
of fruits and vegetables is relatively high in nearly all the countries. 
It is probable that over the next decade agricultural production in the 
Near East will increase slightly faster than population growth. 
The United Arab Republic faces a problem of limited land and water 
resources with which to grow food for a large and rapidly growing population. 
Food deficits will probably increase in the future. 
A 
Latin America 
This region promises to remain a problem as regards food. With present 
population growth, it is doubtful whether agricultural output can keep pace 
with population growth. Consumption of food per cuput varies widely among 
the countries-ranging from less than 1900 calories per day in Haiti to nearly 
3000 calories per day in Uruguay. Argentina and Uruguay produce nearly 1 
all the food they consume and export substantial quantities. Most of the j 
countries are trying to achieve greater self-sufliciency and had had con- f 
siderabk success, but unless more effort is devoted to kgriculture, net food 
imports wil l  probably increase over the next decade. 
In common with other under-developed areas, Latin America is going 
through a period of rapid social change. The existing systems of land tenure 
may change in the years ahead, possibly causing a temporary disruption in 
1 
food and agricultural production. 'J 1
4 
Africa I 
! If the political problems of emerging statehood can be mastered quickly, , 
the outlook for increased agricultural output per capita over the next decade 
is good Consum.ption of dories per day ranges from over 2100 per capita ' 
in several countries to over 2600 per mpita in others. No country has to rely 
on substantial imports of food, and a number produce food commodities for 
ex*, I 
The substantial land and water resources available for development will 
be a great asset if capital and technical assistance are extended. 
Far East 
This is the world's chief problem area as regards food. Once a net exporter 
of grain, it has become a large net importer since the second World War. It 
stiU produces large export surpluses of fats and oils, rubber, tin, and jute 
which earn a large proportion of its foreign exchange. 
Although food production has increased since the immediate post-war 
period, output per capita is still below prewar levels, strikingIy so in several 
countries. Food consumption is considerably below the estimated require 
ments as indicated earlier. 
All the countries in the region have begun long-range development plans 
for agriculture. A number of problems threaten the successful accomplish- 
- ment of these plans: lack of sufficient capital for investment, high illiteracy 
rates, particdady among farmers, soils badly depleted in some areas by 
centuries of cultivation, and a constantly declining amount of arable land 
per capita. 
The agricultural potential of the more sparsely populated rice bowl 
countries (Burma, Thailand, Laos, Cambodia, and South Viet-Nam) will 
probably languish for lack of demand for export. In Japan and Taiwan, 
where agriculture is very intensively practised, it seems doubtful whether 
'elds will continue to increase as they have over the past decade. Other 
countries, such as thc Philippines, Indonesia, Pakistan, Ceylon and India 
will be hard pressed to increase farm output faster than population. r
More foreign financial and technical assistance will be necessary to achieve 
even modest increases in agricultural output per capita. Otherwise, foreign 
exchange earnings will be largely absorbed in payments for food imports. 
Means of Increasing Output of Food 
There is no doubt that the potential definitely exists to increase substan- 
tially the world's food output. The possible means include bringing new land 
into production so that there can be a higher and better quality production 
on present agriculturaI lands; and massively supplementing agricultural pro- 
duction through synthesis of the basic fwd elements or by culture of lower 
plant forms such as yeast and algae. 

in the tropics 3s low and they tend to deteriorate quickly by erosion and 
leaching Men they are cleared for cultivation. Largely for these reasons, 
mankind has had little success in developing stable, high-yie1diog systems 
of agriculture in the tropics, except in some relatively small &as where 




























&mw: PA0 J h x k t h  Y-k, 1959, page 7. 
TABLE 12 
lNCRaASE OF ARBX fN MAJOR CROPI, 1948-52 TO 1958. 
FOR THE WORLD AND REGIONS 
BlEUlTQPd (ea~~. USSR). .............. 
UmR ........................... 
N- Amedca ................. 
l,ath*.... ...........*.... 
Near l 3 W . m  ...................... 
Par Baet*.. ...................... 

for important additions, t5mugh irrigation, to the land resources of some oi 
the more densely populated countries of southern and eastern Asia, including 
India and Pakistan, Ceylon, and China. d 
Although the execution qf all irrigation projects now considered tech- 
nically possible in various parts of the world would not increase the world's 
cultivable land area by a very large percentage, the contribution to food- 
producing capacity would be proportionately greater, as high yields can 
generally be obtained from irrigated lands. Studies and experiments now 
under way may lead to a considerable extension of the technical possibilities 
in the future. However, 'me limiting factor is not knowledge, as in the equa- 
torial lands and the savannahs of the "new" continents, but finance''? 
In $he well-watered areas of the temperate zones, the two principal areas 
with large amounts of land not used for crops, although climate and other 
conditions are favourable, are southern Australia and the plains of southern 
Brazil and Uruguay. These lands are used mainly for grazing livestocks; the 
main obstacles to this conversion to crop land are land tenure conditio~u 
and cultural traditions. Similar possibilities for extending cultivation in 
the temperate zones of the Northern Hemisphere are much more narrowly 
limited* There the main reserves of potentially arable land are in the podmi- 
soil-zones of the Northern USSR and Canada. It has been estimated that 
about ten per cent of these lands, or 300 million acres, might ultimately be 
brought under e~ltivation.~ 
Increased production per hectare 
While expanding the area under cultivation will be important, it is evident 
that for many regions, particularly the densely settled ones, greater output 
per hectare of land wilt be necessary. There are great potentialities for in- 
creasing food production by application of improved practices to land 
already under cultivation. 
A number of possibilities for increasing yields may be mentioned? 
Zrnproved crop varieties 
Through the application of modem genetics, within limits crop varieties 
can be bred to meet specific requirements, such as climatic adaptation, high 
yields, improved quality, and resistance to disease. While much plant breed- 
ing work is being done, some of it in underdeveloped areas, the wide diversity 
of soil and climatic conditions means that a multitude of varieties must be 
developed. Lack of trained personnel and facilities has hampered progress in 
- 
6 "PossMitie8 of Increasing the Supply of Food and Agricultural Products by ExpIoitntion of New 
Areas and Increasing YiddsYs, by W. H. Pawley and other experts of the FAO staB in Proceedings of 
the World Population Conference, 1954, Volume V (United N?tio? Publicatioh, Sales No. 1955. 
XIII.8). A revised version of this paper IS bemg prepared for pubhcat~on by the FAO in the near future 
as one of the basic studies for the Freedom-from-Hunger Campaign. 
this field. Nevertheless, very substantial gains in production could be achieved 
in underdeveloped countries by wider use of the improved varieties that are 
now known, in areas for which they are suited. Ignorance and the bonds of 
tradition are major hindrances, as well as the difficulties of obtaining the 
improved seeds and achieving other Changes in agricultural techniques, on 
which satisfactory results from the cultivation of new varieties often depends. 
Building up soil fertility 
Tremendous increases in food production per hectare could be achieved 
by better soil management and more use of fertilizers in under-developed 
areas where the natural fertility of the soil is low or where it has been depleted 
by destructive methods of cultivation. EfEcient crop rotation schemes involv- 
ing the use of legumes and grasses to add humus and nitrogen to the soil are 
of great importance in this comexion, as well as the use of compost and 
animal manure in mixed-farming systems. There has been little or no de- 
velopment of such agricultural methods in enormous areas of the under- 
developed world. Chemical fertilizers also could play an extremely important 
part in increasing production per hectare. In India, for instance, it has been 
estimated that a moderate dressing of about 30 kilogrammes of nitrogen per 
hectare would bring an increase of more than 10 million tons in the annual 
production of rice. According to FAO experts, food production could be 
increased by at least 50 per cent in almost all countries of the world, and it 
c o a  be doubled in many areas, simply by better and more intensive use 
of fertilizers, manures, and leg~rnes.~ If chemical fertilizers are to be used 
widely, however, there 'must be substantial facilities for producing them 
and the farmers must be able to afford to buy them. Full benefits are only 
gained from them by extensive soil testing, demonstration and a d d r y  
services. 
Combating pests a d  diseases 
Great quantities of food are destroyed each year by pests and diseases 
which attack either the growing crops and livestock or the food products as 
they are processed, stored, and transported. It is believed that these lusses 
are equivalent to the annual production of many millions of hectares. Most 
of them could be prevented at relatively small cost by applying the scientific 
knowledge which is now available. The gap between what is done and 
what could be done in this respect has never been wider than it is today, 
when new weapons for control of pests and diseases that have been produced 
- .  . rsattet, op. dt. 
@ Leonard, 'World Population In Relation to Potential Food Supply", ScIcnttfIc Monthly, Sept. 11M7; 
Pawley, and others, op. dt. 
Pawley and others, op .  cit. 
by ocientific research in recent years, for. example, fungicideat, antibiotic% 
insecticides, and weed killers are far more efficient than any known in the 
part. It b sarwly economical, however, to spend much on disease and pest 
control measures where the yields are very low because of other factors. As 
yields are improved by other means, plant and livestock protection ,m play 
an increasingly important role in food production. More and better re- 
frigeration and storage facilities, where these are lacking or inadequate, can 
also do much to reduce food losses. 
Agricultural implements a d  machinery 
Mechanical equipment has revolutionized fanning in m e  parts of the 
world, principally North America, Europe and the USSR, and Australia. 
W e  i t  has made possible vastly increased output per worker, its contribu- 
tion to increasing output per hectare has been much more modest. In many 
of the under-developed countries, the advbtage that could be obtained 
from increased use of agricultural machinery under present conditions would 
be limited in view of the existing surpluses of agricultural labour, as well as 
the difficulties of obtaining fuel, servicing, and spare parts. More important 
gains in production per hectare, and also in facilitating the extension of 
cultivated areas, could be won by improvements in simple tools, such as the 
substimtion of a metal hoe for a wooden digging stick, equipping a wooden 
plougbshare with a steel point, and using a wheeled cart to transport mate& 
and produce which are now being carried laboriously on a man's back. 
Greater production of livestock 
Domestic animals and fowl are an important source of food in the form 
of meat, d a i i  products, and eggs. Better feeding and breeding methods 
artificial insemination, and disease and pest control can make possible 
higher production of these products. Animals are able to convert food re- 
sources unsuitable for direct use by man. They supply nutrients that are 
deficient in the high cereal diets on which much of the world population 
subsists. However, in several regions of the world, notably India and parti 
of Africa, there would be little advantage in increasing livestocks in present 
circumstances; religious and cultural traditions lead to the existence of 
excessive numbers of poor quality livestock which are competitors with 
human beings for food rather than being a primary source of food. 
Combhution of practices 
While important gains in agricultural production can often be made 
through application of one or two simple measures, continued progress in 
increasing production depends on combining such practices as improved 
seeds, fedhers, soil and water management, and pest control into a W- 
a n d  system of husbandry. 
I , 
Other sources of food 
Fish is an important source of food in many countries, and contributm 
about 10 per cent of the total animal protein in the current world food supply. 
It is potentially important particularly for protein-short regions. Cultivation 
of &h has long been practised in ponds or paddies in China and Japan where 
it is an important source of animal protein, and the practice has spread to 
several other c o d e s  in the Far East. The world fishery catch before World 
War 11 was approximately 20 million tons. It barely recovered in the post- 
war period, and now stands at about 36 million tons (See table 13). Sizable 
fisheries are being exploited off Africa and South America. 
In recent years a number of altogether untouched sources of food have 
been discussed as possibilities for expanding world food output. Yeasts and 
algae with high protein and vitamin content can be used to convert wastes 
' into food and to produce large quantities of material per hectare. At present, t . 
these processes may not be economically feasible and their products may not 
be accepted. 
A number of vitamins are now produced synthetically and cheaply. Con- 
centrated foodstu~ can also be manufactured as diet supplements on a 
mass scale. 
Summary of the prob1em of food proddo11 
To s u m  up, it is clear that the earth's physical resources and man's present 
technical knowledge are suilicient to multiply the world's production of food 
many times. But the existence of resources and technical knowledge is not 
enough in itself to bring about the increase of production which the world 
desperately needs at present and the further increases which will be needed 
in the future to feed the growing population according to a satisfactory 
standard. To be effective, knowledge must be applied in developing resources 
and increasing productivity. The magnitude of the obstacles that must be 
overcome in bringing present knowledge into full play throughout the world 
cannot be over-emphasized. 
Fanners must be given the incentive to produce larger quantities of food. 
Reliable markets, good prices, and facilities for transport, storage, handling, 
and processing must be developed. Chahnels of supply for fertilizers, pesti- 
cides, and improved seeds must be expanded. Institutional reforms affecting 
such matters as credit and tenure are often necessary. Advisory services must 
be supplied to spread the techniques that have proved successful and re- 
search programmes to develop successful practices are necessary. Capital 
must be obtained and invested, not only in the development of land resources 
and agricultural equipment, but also in the non-agricultural sector of tbe 
eco~~~ny-in industrial plants, railroads, storage facilities, hboratorjes, and 
so on-and also in schools, hospitals, and the other essential fadities for 
social and economic progress. 
So the problem of mouths and food is seen as an inseparable part of the 
whole, vast problem of economic, social, and cultural development of the 
world's under-developed regions. There is no sure or simple answer. On the 
relation of population growth to these problems, a survey published by the 
United Nations Economic Commission for Asia and the Far Eastlo stated 
that "the faster the population grows, the more diEcult it be to assure the 
necessary investment funds for an equivalent increase in agriculture produc- 
tion, and capital is one of the main limiting factors to economic growth in 
Asian countries. Furthermore, the cumulative nature of changes in popula- 
tion size following from a continued high rate of fertility win increase pressure 
on effective food supplies unless there is a considerably greater acceleration 
in such supplies than foreseeable . . ." 
"If Asian agricuiture adopted the modemized techniques used in some 
other parts of the world, food production in most of the countries could 
probably be made to keep pace with this upsurge in demand for food. In 
addition, research and technological advancement might make it possible 
to cultivate land which has been hitherto considered uncultivable." 
The solution of the world's food crisis appears to be a matter of having 
not only the power but also the will to solve it. The total application of exist- 
ing technologies would unquestionably provide enough and for all. But how 
can this knowledge be put to work? Where will the capital come from to set 
up this world food production plant? What might be done to redistribute the 
existing food? At present, 400 million human beings in the western industrial 
nations consume as much protein as 1,300 million of their fellow men in 
Asia. A great effort must be made to equalize these disparities. 
C 
' 0  Ecoluwnic Bulletin for Ada and the Far East, June 1959. 
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C H A P T E R  VI 
The Issue of Population Policy 
In terms of simple arithmetic, it seems evident that the problem of achiev- 
ing the needed increases in food production during the next decades would 
be made easier, and the risk of faiiures would be diminished, if the population 
were to increase less than is indicated by the projections of present trends for 
the economically less developed regions of the world. Actually, the mathe- 
matics of the problem are not so simple; it is not just a question of addition 
of a larger or smaller number of consumers to share a certain quantity of 
food, for people are producers as well as consumers. While population growth 
adds to requirements, it also contributes, through increasing manpower, to 
the possibilities of producing food and other goods. It is necessary to CXMI- 
sider the rehive effects on requirements and productive capacity in order 
to get a correct expression of the equation of food and mouths, and the form 
of the equation is not the same in regimes where the economic circumstaslce~ 
differ. Still, when these complexities are talcen into account, it appears that 
population growth at the rates now observed in most of the mder-developed 
countries is a major hindrance in solving the problems of fwd supply and 
of general economic and social development. 
With few exceptions, the experts who have studied this question agree that 
the outlook would be far more favourable if the present rates of population 
increase in the underdeveloped countries could be slowed down by modera- 
tion of birth rates. In fact, some experts hold that unless the growth of 
population becomes slower in the near future, there is little hope of improving 
the conditions of life in many of these countries or even to hold the present 
low levels of living may prove to be f icul t .  
In the case of India, it is clear that the present rate of population growth 
is a very serious impediment to the country's economic development and 
the solution of its food problem. Coale and Hooverx1 have worked out a 
series of three models to show how the conditions might appear in 1986 with 
different assumptions for the trend of human fertility in India up to that time. 
In each model it is assumed that the death rate wil l  fall by more than 40 
per cent by 1986. 
Model I assumes that fertility begins to decline immediately and continues 
down to half its present level by 198 1. 
" Op. Cit. 
Model 11 assnmes no change in fertility until 1966, and then a decline so 
sharp that fertility is cut in half by 198 1. 
Model 111 assumes that fertility will remain at the present level until 1986. 
The analysis includes such items as national income available for invest- 
ment in productive facilities; needs for housing, social services, s h l i n g ,  
and dher welfare expenditures; and the proportion of labour force in the 
total population. It does not take into account certain intangible gains such 
as increased vigour of the population owing to better living conditions. 
Under Model I, with an immediate decline in the birth rate, the population 
win grow to 589 million by 1986. Since there is no immediate prospect of 
aa effective lowering of the M a n  birth rate, this model is mainly of theoret- 
ical internst. It does serve to stress how important the level of fertility is to 
a nation which wants to achieve an economic break-through. I£ India's birth 
rate had miraculougly started to decline in 1959, her economy and the welfare 
of her people would be far more advanced in 1986 than under either of the 
other ah~matives. 
Under existing conditions, there is a definite possibility that Model I1 might 
be achieved. I£ the birth rate should begin to drop sharply after 1966, the 
population would grow to 634 W o n  by 1986. 
Under Model III, with the birth rate remaining at its present level, a popu- 
lation af 775 million is the prospect for 1986. That is nearly double the 
present population. 
Coale and Hoover find that continuing high fertility would present a major 
barrier to an economic breakthrough. The proportion of children under 15 
in 1986 would be so high (42 per cent, compared with 30 per cent for the 
low projection) as to constitute a decisive handicap to economic develop 
ment. 
By that time, only 10.1 per cent of India's national income would be 
available for productive investment. With almost twice as many people, each 
year a larger proportion of capital would be diverted for essential social 
services, such as he* and education and for non-productive investment, 
such as housing. In contrast, under the low-fertility pattern of Model I, 14.7 
per cent of the national income would be available for productive investment. 
The difference between 10.1 per cent and 14.7 per cent of the national 
income may not seem impressive. But for a nation struggling to emerge from 
a marginid agrarian culture, it might well mean the difference between victory 
and defeat in the battle for economic self-sufficiency. The higher percentage 
would be adequate to provide a gradual improvement of living levels. Under 
Model 111, a decline not only of the per mpitu gross national product but of 
the total national product would be expected. 
The problem is not the same where the density of population is lower and 
there are large reserves of unused or little used land suitable for agriculture, 
as in many countries of Latin America and Africa. But it has been pointed 
out that even in such circumstan~, excessively rapid growth of papuhtbn 
is a major hindrance to economic development. The report of r recent 
United Nations seminar on populatfon problems in Latin America makm the 
following obe~ations on this score: l2 
''Of coune for each new mouth there is plso a pair of hands. But the moolth 
has to be fed now; the hands be&ne useful only some years later. In several 
Lath American countries as much as 40 per cent of the population is undsr 
the age of -.-At the same time, Governments must find productive job 
for a rapidly growing and sometimes poorly trained labour force, a task which 
entails demands oo scar& capital resources which would not be made by a 
population growing leas rapidly. From each of these points of view, p m n t  
rates of population gmwth are a real handicap to economic development. ". . . me majority of the c o d e s  in this region are generally believed to be 
under-popdated in the sense that if they had more people, suitably diatrihbd 
within their territory, they could make more effective use of reso- which 
are now idle, d could benefit from certain economies in the scale of produc- 
tion and distribution of goods and services . . . On the other hand, it seem 
to have been made clear that nearly aIl countries of the region are suffering 
from a considerable handicap in their &orb towards ecos1omic development 
because of the rapid rates at which their populations are growing. Those which 
arc under-populated naturally have less reason to be concerned about this 
m a w  than the others, but in their case, too, it seems evident that in spite of 
the advantages which in the long run might accrue to them from a larger popu- 
lation, their economic progress would be more satisfact0 ry if they could arrive 
at th-e larger numbers at a more leisurely pace." 
These considerations lend force and urgency to the demands for policies 
in favour of birth regulation which are being pressed upon governments in 
various parts of the world and upon the United Nations. But the issue of 
population policy and birth regulation is not purely one of economics. i t  also 
involves questions of cultural ideals, moral principles, and d a l  and political 
philosophy which are seen in different EgMs by the people and the govcm- 
ments of different countries. Some groups object in principle to birth control 
in general or to certain forms of it; others hold that thc decision to practise 
it or not should be left strictly to the people without any governmental 
interference or pressure. 
The councils of the United Nations, confronted with the sharp differences 
'X in view on this question, have taken the position that it must be left to each 
national government to decide its own policy. The United Nations Population ' Commission declved in the report to the Bmnomic and Said Council on 
its eleventh session (1961 ) : l3 
"It is the responsibility of each Government to decide itr own policies and 
devise its own programmes of action for dealing with the problems of popda- 
1' sadinm on Evaluation adl Utilization of Population Cemm Data in Latin America (ST/TAO/ 
SHRC/46* B/CN.9JCX)NF.l/l/Rev.l). United Nations, NGW YOTk 1960. p. 37. 
1s popadat& Commfasfon, Report of the Eleventh Stsston (7-17 ~e'bmaq 1961). BcaM#lrie and 
Sodsl C o d ,  OfWal Romrds, ~-~ sesdon, Supplement No. 3. 
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tion and economic and social development. In particular, each Govsmmmt 
must decide for itself whether or not any measures should be taken for the 
purpose of modifying the trends of population as an aid to the solution of 
these problems, taking into account the work of the Population Commission. 
On the other hand, it is in the interest of the United Nations that decitions on 
national policies should be taken, and national action programmes &odd be 
planned, in the light of knowledge of the relevant facts, and that the pro- 
grammes should be adequate to assure satisfactory economic and social prog- 
ress. Among the circumstances which must be considered are the relevant 
features of national culture and ideals as well as the trend of population, the 
physical resources and other economic CK-tances of each country. It is 
appropriate that the United Nations should encourage and assist the Govern- 
ments, especially of the less developed countries, in obtaining basic data and 
carrying out essential studies of the demographic aspects, as well as other 
aspects, of their economic and social development problems. It is also con- 
sidered appropriate for the United Nations to give technical assistance, as 
quested by Governments, for national projects of research, experimentation 
and action for dealing with problems of population." 
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In mainland China, the programme of family planning was launched in 
1955. The results of the 1953 population census had just been published, 
and the effect of the rapid population increase on the problems of indus- 
trialization and economic development was realized. 
The programme, first on a modest scale, but considerably i n t d d  for 
a time subsequently, made guidance in family planning an important part d 
the activities of hospitals, and child and maternity centres. There is no %liable 
information regarding the effects of this programme on the birth rate. 
In Japan, the Government, before and during the Second World War, 
enforced a pro-natalist policy. But public interest in family planning rose 
sharply soon after the close of the War probably owing to economic pressure 
upon the families. Abortions flourished; in 1948, abortions and sterilization 
were legalized on certain specified grounds; in 1952 further liberalization d 
the abortion law took place. Abortions are estimated to be approximately 
equally in number to live b i i s ,  but the frequency of abortions may be on the 
decline as a result of the vigorous programme for promoting dissemination 
of contraceptive information. 
The birth rate in Japan dropped from 30.1 per 1,000 population in 
1945-49 to only 17.2 per 1,000 in 1957. As the death rate dropped during 
this period from 17 to 8 per 1,000, the net result was to bring the annual rate 
of natural increase of the population down from 1.3 per cent to 0.9 per a t .  
Japan's b i i  rate at present is as low as or lower than the rates of most 
European countries and considerably below the present birth rates in the 
USSR, the United States and Canada. In Japan's case, the movement to limit 
births was greatly facilitated by the comparatively high degree of industrid- 
ization and economic development of the country, and the high level of 
education of the people, in comparison with other countries in Asia and the 
Far East. 
In a number of other areas, including Ceylon, China (Taiwan), Hong 
Kong and Singapore, family planning activities are supported by the Gm- 
ernment although the Government itself does not take a lead in promoting 
such measures. In countries such as the Federation of Malaya and Thailand, 
family planning activities are supported by private organizations only, with 
no direct assistance from the Government. 
In those parts of the world where there is strong opposition to birth-control 
programmes on moral, religious, or other grounds, the solution of the popu- 
lation problems is all the more diEcult. The report of the United Nations 
seminar on p0;pulation problems in Latin America, mentioned earlier, con- 
tains the foliowing remark on this subject: 
UMost Oovernments in Latin America would be very hesitant to adopt a policy 
aimed at encouraging f a d y  planning. For them, if they feel an need to 
llow down population growth, the appropriate measures of policy I& bc less 
direct--they might be concerned, for instance, with possible means of hstilhg 
into the minds of the poem and less educated classes of the people a kaner 
sense of rqmllslWty and prudence in regard to marriage and fk birth of 
children, which would be consistent with their religious ideals and the highest 
values of their culture." 
In spit+ of all the diitlculties, it may prove possible within a decade or two 
to achieve with determined eeorts, appreciable reductions of birth rates in 
the oountries where national policies having this aim have been adopted, or 
whue they may be adopted in the near future. But it scarcely seems realistic 
in view of all the circumstances to expect a radical reduction of births in the 
under-developed cowltries generally during the next ten or twenty years. 
Meanwhile9 the population of most of these countries can be expected to go 
on growing rapidly--quite possibly even more rapidly than it is growing at 
present. Thus it is absolutely imperative to find adequate solutions for the 
problems of increasing food production sufEciently during the decades ahead, 
especially in those countries where the present standards of food consump 
tion are lowest and where the largest increases of popdation are in store. 
Proepects of in- food pmaudi011 
iFsl 
Experts are convinced that technical knowledge exists to meet the world's 
present food shortages and to take care of the needs that will result from 
population growth for some time to come. Similarly, there is enough technical 
knowledge of the means of controlling births to bring about a decided mod- 
eration of the rate of population growth whenever the Governments-and 
more important, the people-have the will to do so. 
If everything possible were done to bring the existing technical knowledge 
of food production methods to bear fully throughout the world-including, 
among other things, largescale programmes for training key personnel, 
vigorous and imaginative attacks on ignorance and traditional inertia, and 
massive mobilization of capital on a worldwide scale for investments in 
agricultural and industrial development of the under-developed regions-the 
Freedom from Hunger Campaign might achieve its great objective over thq 
course of some decades. But neither the present programmes nor the efforts 
to implement them are adequate. 
In India, for instance, the current large expenditure on agricultural re- 
search and development has served to increase food production by about 
3 per cent a year, but an 8.2 per cent annual increase is necessary to meet #i 
the 1965-66 targets for adequate prod~ction.~ 
4 
'4 Rqwrf on India'# Food CrtsSs and Steps to Meet It. Government of Indirt. Aprit, 1959. p. 11. 1 
With reference to the countries of Asia and the Far East, the ECAFE 
report previously quoted1& puts the problem in these terms: 
". . . If Asian agriculture adopted the modernized techniques used in some 
parts of the world, food production in most of the countries could probably 
be made to keep pace with this upsurge in demand for food. In addition, 
research and technological advance may make it possible to cultivate land 
which has been hitherto considered uncultivable . . . 
On the assumption that average land productivity in Asia could be raised to 
Japanese levels, that calorie supplies were increased to 2,500 per person per 
day and the present low-protein type of diet maintained, many countries could 
still support a population two or three times as big as their present population. 
Assumptions, on the other hand, of calorie supplies at the same level as in, say, 
the western European countries and a diet of a high animal protein content 
would imply that many countries, even at the very high Japanese levels of land 
productivity, could support fewei people than their present populations . . . 
All these calculations indicate the need to bring the present divergent trends in 
mortality and f m t y  into a closer balance within a not very distant future." 
In addition to the programmes for increasing agricultural efficiency 
through fertilizers, seeds, mechanization and better techniques, there is the 
technical possibiity, although at somewhat higher costs, of producing foods 
from sources not now exploited: algae, yeasts, fish meals, and hydroponics, 
and by the use of extractive methods for converting plants directly into pro- 
teins and oils instead of raising secondary sources of nutrients such as fish 
and animals. However, the mculties must not be underestimated-"the 
mere fact that it is theoretically possible to increase food production should 
not blind us to the magnitude of the task. It is immense. Agriculture involves 
more of the people of the world than any other productive activity. To change 
its procedures, we must change attitudes."' 
By 1970, the population of the earth will be increased by over half a 
billion. Most of this increase can be expected to occur in the under-developed, 
food-short regions of Asia, Africa and Latin America, where population 
growth rates in some countries are now higher than any that have been 
known in the history of the human race. 
Time is too precious to be wasted in futile arguments over what steps 
should be taken first to deal with the problem of population and food supply. 
Nothing less than an "all out" attack on aIl major aspects of the problem can 
bring success. To banish hunger and achieve a minimal diet for all people 
in the face of rapid population growth will at best take time. To check popu- 
lation growth in those countries where such is the desire of the people and 
their governments will also take time. And time is of the essence. 
Economic Bulletin for Ada and the Far East, June 1959. 
Br="'? 
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